John Searle, Consciousness, and the Dogmatic Commitment to Naturalism

Recently, I finished reading The Mystery of Consciousness by John Searle.  In my last post, I focused on a section of this book in which Searle confronts some of the flaws in the case made by Daniel Dennett.  In this follow-up post, I thought I'd give a general review and focus more on problems I see with Searle's position.

I enjoyed this book because it was instructive and allowed some good insight into the thoughts and goals of certain secular neuroscientists and philosophers as they try to solve the mystery of consciousness.  It should not come as a surprise that I do not believe this book solved it, and the author admits as much.  But I do think the book achieved one thing...it demonstrates quite well that, among secular scientists and philosophers, the goal is subject to the ideology.  What do I mean by that?

John Searle asserts repeatedly in this book that the brain causes consciousness.  He states that we know this for certain.  But when trying to explain how this happens, he is at a total loss.  Toward the end of the book, on page 193, he admits as much in the following quote:

But the reason consciousness appears to be a 'mystery' is that we don't have a clear idea of how anything in the brain could cause conscious states.

Later, he admits (on page 194) that the ultimate goal in studying consciousness is to figure this mystery out while not abandoning "the scientific worldview".  And this is the problem exactly.  Searle, like so many of his colleagues, is not investigating consciousness in a way that allows him to follow the evidence wherever it leads.  Instead, his efforts are focused on explaining consciousness so that it is consistent with the worldview he already accepts.  This, I'm afraid, is not legitimate scientific inquiry.  It's dogmatism.

Dr. JP Moreland, in his book "The Recalcitrant Imago Dei" (pp. 4-5) has this to say:

Now, the dictionary defines 'recalcitrant' as 'being obstinately unco-operative, hard to handle or deal with'.  A recalcitrant fact is one that is obstinately unco-operative in light of attempts to handle it by some theory.  A theory may explain some facts quite nicely.  But a recalcitrant fact doggedly resists explanation by a theory.  No matter what a theory's advocate does, the recalcitrant fact just sits there and is not easily incorporated into the theory.  In this case, the recalcitrant fact provides falsifying evidence for the theory. 

One way to 'handle' recalcitrant facts is to deny them.  Another is to proffer an ad hoc adjustment to one's theory.  An ad hoc adjustment of a theory is an irrational, intellectualy unacceptable adjustment of a theory whose sole rationale is to save it from falsifying evidence.  As such, an ad hoc adjustment has no other independent reasons that can be offered on its behalf... 

...Important examples of such features, and thus of such recalcitrant facts, are consciousness, free will, rationality, the self, intrinsic value and equal rights/dignity, the reality and nature of human meaning and flourishing...Thus, they provide confirmation for biblical theism and evidence against scientific naturalism.

Moreland has hit the nail on the head.  Within naturalism (or "the scientific worldview" as Searle describes it), there are certain facts that just don't fit.  Some advocates of naturalism decide to deny these recalcitrant facts (as Daniel Dennett denies consciousness even exists).  Others attempt to shoehorn these facts into their worldview through a variety of means.  Searle is guilty of the second type of error.  He admits that he has no idea how brains could cause consciousness, but he simply knows that they do (insert shoehorn, apply pressure).

Searle admits that he wants to preserve the scientific worldview, and that his efforts are in service to that larger goal.  The problem is, the facts of consciousness don't fit nicely into his worldview no matter how hard he tries.

So while I enjoyed this book and I recommend it (if for no other reason than the spirited disagreement Searle has with Dennett, and the back-and-forth which is recorded in its pages), I don't think it does a great service to those seeking answers to the mystery of consciousness.  What it does is demonstrate what it's like to have a faith commitment to a particular worldview, and to engage in an effort to fit inconvenient (or recalcitrant) facts into that worldview.

But be cautious not to blindly accept that brains must cause consciousness.  That has certainly not been proven, and any attempt to convince us otherwise is merely an effort to salvage the naturalistic worldview in spite of evidence (those recalcitrant facts) that contradicts it.