For many years now, I've been aware that Daniel Dennett is an academic and a professional philosopher. He has made quite a name for himself as one of the "Four Horsemen" of the New Atheist movement. Dennett's role has been to function more as a philosopher, particularly focusing on the Philosophy of Mind. I've also been aware that Dennett has published several works, all with the seeming goal of discrediting the Christian worldview in one way or another. I was even aware of Dennett's conclusions when it came to his Philosophy of Mind. What I was not aware of (though in retrospect I should have been) was his reasons for adopting his position.
In Searle's book, in the chapter Conscious Denied: Daniel Dennett's Account, we are treated to a good summary of what Dennett claims to be true when it comes to consciousness. In reviewing Dennett's book Consciousness Explained, Searle summarizes things this way (page 99):
The peculiarity of Daniel Dennett's book can now be stated: he denies the existence of the data. He thinks there are no such things as the second sort of entity, the feeling of pain. He thinks there are no such things as qualia, subjective experiences, first-person phenomena, or any of the rest of it. Dennett agrees that it seems to us that there are such things as qualia, but this is a matter of mistaken judgment we are making about what really happens.Before going further, perhaps I should explain that qualia is the first-person subjective experience of things at an inner level. For example, the perception of color or pain. These things cannot be explained by purely physical phenomena (there is nothing in the molecular makeup of a rose that leads to our perceiving it being red). Note that I am not saying that physical phenomena cannot account for things like pain. Certainly our nervous system sends signals to our brain and this explains how we are notified of pain. Instead, qualia is the actual sensation of pain. Why do we experience it as we do? It's a qualitative sensation that has never been (and in my view, will never be) explained purely in physical terms.
When it comes to things like qualia or the first-person perspective (the sense that there is a "me" and that "I" have independent thoughts and desires and dreams, etc.), Dennett denies them. In fact, he denies that consciousness exits at all! He says we are merely mistaken and it only appears we're conscious. It's just an illusion and is not real (one wonders if we have to be conscious to recognize that consciousness is an illusion).
Now, I knew all of these things (and I recognized how utterly absurd they were...after all, if you don't have conciousness you aren't reading this right now!). What I did not consider was Dennett's reasons for holding this conclusion. And when Searle mentioned it, I had one of those moments where I suddenly wished I'd given it more thought at the outset. It's pretty simple, really.
Consider that Dennett, like his atheist brethren in the New Atheist movement have, in large part, a commitment to an outdated philosophy known as verificationism. In short, verificationism is the claim that if you can't prove something scientifically, it can't be counted as knowledge. In other words, if science can't prove it exists, it doesn't. And when it comes to consciousness, scientists and secular philosophers are completely stumped. They have been searching for centuries to explain the existence of consciousness within the confines of their worldviews. They have not been able to do so, and today are no closer to a solution than they were in the past.
Enter Daniel Dennett (and a few others, like Paul and Patricia Churchland). He also cannot solve the mystery of consciousness. He has been unable to show that it reduces down to biological processes (no one has), so he goes the extra step and denies it exists at all! Give Dennett credit for this. At least he lives out his worldview to the extent that he accepts the conclusion of his verificationism. But perhaps we should check verificationism out to see if it holds water. Is it, indeed, a sound worldview from which to base our view of what's real and what isn't?
Consider that David Hume, in his book An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, asked the following question:
If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics (works on religion and philosophy) let us ask this question, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can be nothing but sophistry and illusionHume here is an early form of verificationism. If it can't be subjected to experimental reasoning (a.k.a. the scientific method) then it's meaningless and can't be counted as true. Fast forward to the early 20th century and we have the Vienna Circle and its brand of verificationism known as Logical Positivism. If you want to read up on it, check out AJ Ayer's book Language, Truth and Logic. Ayer was one of the architects of this new movement, and he advocated what he called the 'principle of verifiability' which is essentially identical to what Hume said and what Dennett believes.
Only one problem exists with the principle of verifiability. It's logically incoherent! Consider the following...if something can only be counted as true if it is logically necessary (which verificationism certainly is not) or testable through the scientific method (which verificationism also is not), then verificationism fails the test and can't be counted as true!
In other words, if verificationism is true then it's false. It is literally self-refuting!
Philosophers such as Ayer realized their mistake and they abandoned verificationism. Today, virtually no philosopher holds such a view. But that hasn't stopped people like Daniel Dennett. Though the view is utterly discredited in professional circles, he's picked up the banner again and is using it as his foundation for why he rejects the existence of consciousness. All of this is fine, but just remember...he rejects consciousness because of his commitment to verificationism. And verificationism is self-refuting. Thus, Dennett's reasons for rejecting consciousness are self-refuting.
There are other things that disturb me about Dennett. This includes his seeming willingness to say and write deceptive things in order to carry his point (for instance, he denies Searles' claim that he concealed his view on the non-existence of consciousness, even though he previously affirmed he was doing exactly that to another critic of his work...this seems to be more of a pattern with Dennett than the exception, I'm afraid).
The bottom line is this. Consciousness exists and we all know it. To deny it is simply a desperate attempt to explain away a phenomenon that doesn't fit nicely into a naturalistic worldview (a worldview which says that nothing exists beyond the material universe). To admit consciousness exists is on step toward admitting the supernatural realm exists. And Dennett won't have any of that, even if he has to go to the absurd point of denying the existence of something we all know is real (honestly, is anyone reading this thinking "I guess I don't exist after all"?).
Other scientists and philosophers try to explain consciousness in a manner that's consistent with a naturalistic worldview (they talk about emergent consciousness which is a function of the brain, or how consciousness is nothing more than an epiphenomenon of brain function, etc.). I applaud them for not simply taking Dennett's nonsensical position. But at the same time, trying to explain consciousness as emerging from (like the rainbow we see emerging from the spray produced by a waterfall), or identical to, physical processes is like someone who sets out on a project to explain where rain comes from but rules out the possibility that it comes from clouds. That person may come up with some really interesting theories about the source of rain, but none of them will win out because the real source of rain has been eliminated from the start.
Searle says in his own book many times that brains produce consciousness. He never proves this. He never even offers evidence for this. But he admits that this is his ideology and he is busy trying to confirm it. In this regard, he can't blame Dennett for also doing the work to confirm his own ideology. Both of them are wrong, but both are merely doing what they believe is necessary to preserve their own ideologies.
Only when each of them abandons the ideology and accepts that the evidence must be followed wherever it leads, even if it leads them to reject their naturalism, will they have any hope of getting to the bottom of what consciousness truly is. As a Christian, I know that I exist. I know that I am conscious. I know that this is not reducible to physical processes, and that my inner experience is not merely an epiphenomenon. I don't hold this view just because of my ideology. I hold it because I've tested the theory and reasoned through the issues. And I have found that the evidence supports a dualistic view (the view that the mind is real and not merely a component of a purely physical universe).
I won't go into all of my reasoning here (perhaps in a future post). But if you do want to read up on my view, I'd point you to a great book by Dr. JP Moreland entitled Body and Soul. He lays out an excellent case for dualism, showing how it is well supported by the evidence, and is the only plausible answer to the question of consciousness.
